Conceptualizing Indigenous Historical Justice Toward a Mutual Recognition with State in Taiwan by Mona, Awi
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 28 Number 3 
7-1-2019 
Conceptualizing Indigenous Historical Justice Toward a Mutual 
Recognition with State in Taiwan 
Awi Mona 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Awi Mona, Conceptualizing Indigenous Historical Justice Toward a Mutual Recognition with State in 
Taiwan, 28 Wash. L. Rev. 653 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol28/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2019 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING INDIGENOUS HISTORICAL 
JUSTICE TOWARD A MUTUAL RECONCILIATION WITH 
STATE IN TAIWAN 
Awi Mona (Chih-Wei Tsai)
＊＊
 
Abstract: Transitional justice has received considerable attention in recent years 
in Taiwan. Despite all this attention, transitional justice is an issue that remains incomplete 
without addressing justice for indigenous peoples. This paper aims to focus on the essential 
characteristics of indigenous justice against the successive alien regimes. Though the fact 
that the national apology to indigenous peoples may have broken new ground in the 
government’s relationship with indigenous peoples, the common understanding of 
transitional justice has caused significant bitterness and frustration for indigenous peoples. 
Until the core significance of indigenous justice is essentially resolved, the existing 
uncertainty about reconciliation with indigenous peoples will continue. 
Cite as: Awi Mona (Chi-Wei Tsai), Conceptualizing Indigenous Historical Justice Toward 
a Mutual Reconciliation with State in Taiwan, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 653 (2019). 
I. FOREWORD 
In the lead-up to her 2016 presidential victory in Taiwan, President Tsai 
Ing-wen made a campaign pledge to issue a national apology to indigenous 
peoples on behalf of the government.1 As her foundational indigenous policy, 
this pledge actually triggered a series of questions that were not so 
encouraging. Questions like: Who are the indigenous peoples? Why does Tsai 
want to apologize, and for what reasons? Did Tsai do anything bad to 
indigenous peoples? 
Transitional justice has received considerable attention in recent years 
in Taiwan.2  According to the United Nations, transitional justice can be 
undetstood as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”3 
 
＊＊  Associate Professor of Law and Indigenous Studies, National Dong Hwa University, Taiwan; 
Director of the Research Center for Indigenous Education, National Academy of Educational Research, 
Taiwan 
1  Tsai Ing-wen & Chen Chien-jen, Policy Paper on Indigenous Peoples, LIGHT UP TAIWAN, Aug. 1, 
2015, http://iing.tw/posts/46. 
2  A recent controversial issue is the Dong Chang (東廠), the Ming Dynasty-era secret police and spy 
agency, incident which involved a potential breach of neutrality by the Transitional Justice Commission. For 
further report, see generally Sean Lin, Lai apologizes over justice incident, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 3rd, 2018, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/10/03/2003701618. 
3  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
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Traditionally the framework involves four types of approaches: truth-seeking, 
reparations, reform of laws and institutions, and reconciliation. In the past two 
decades, two successive ruling parties (i.e., the Nationalist Party, KMT, and 
Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) have shown parochialist positions 
towards the idea, extent, and scale of transitional justice legislation.4 Despite 
all this attention, transitional justice is an issue that remains incomplete 
without addressing the last piece of the jigsaw puzzle: justice for indigenous 
peoples. As Caldwell observed, the narrowness of the Act on Promoting 
Transitional Justice (cujin zhuanxing Zhengyi tiaoli, 促進轉型正義條例) 
had left many unresolved issues related to indigenous claims for transitional 
and historical justice.5 
Historically, the non-recognition of indigenous political status and lack 
of legal entitlement to indigenous lands have gradually devastated indigenous 
communities and social structures. The most updated indigenous policy 
proposed by President Tsai Ing-wen has broken new ground in the 
government’s relationship with indigenous peoples. That is, the national 
apology to indigenous peoples delivered by President Tsai on August 1, 2016, 
the Indigenous Peoples’ Day of Taiwan.6 Nevertheless, compared to the two 
transitional justice legislations, Taiwan’s history of law-making and policy 
implementation has caused significant bitterness and frustration for 
indigenous peoples. 7  In addition to the institutional defects of the two 
transitional justice legislations,8 the prospect that indigenous peoples will 
find remedies for their problems under the existing transitional justice 
framework is not a promising one. 
Can a state treat indigenous peoples differently from non-indigenous 
peoples in the context of transitional justice? Should indigenous peoples be 
treated differently from the general public for purposes of transitional and 
historical justice? As of today, the national law’s answers to these and similar 
questions seem to be passive and negative. Taking the example of the scope 
 
Societies, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
4  For a detailed discussion, see generally Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legislation in Taiwan 
Beforeand During the Tsai Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 449 (2018). 
5  Id. at 480. 
6  Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee, An official 
apology issued by President Tsai (Aug. 1, 2016), https://indigenous-justice.president.gov.tw/EN/Page/42 . 
7  One is the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate 
Organizations of 2016 and the other is the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice of 2017.  
8  See Caldwell, supra note 4, at 481. 
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and language of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, it purports to deal 
only with the period post-WWII up to the complete lifting of martial law in 
Kinmen and Matsu on November 6, 1992.9 However, indigenous peoples 
have argued that this temporal scope would preclude numerous indigenous 
claims sourced back to earlier times and that this may even erase the 
indigenous existence prior to that period.10 
As aforementioned, President Tsai fulfilled her pledge to deliver the 
national apology to indigenous peoples on behalf of the government. This 
apology officially commenced the project on indigenous transitional and 
historical justice. However, compared with the understanding of transitional 
justice during the authoritarian period, whether in civil society, governmental 
sectors, or academic circles, people seemed quite unconcerned with 
indigenous transitional justice. At best, the national apology merely denoted 
the dialogue between the government representative of the ruling party and 
the indigenous society. Furthermore, most media sources presented President 
Tsai’s apology in a single news event. This limited news coverage might 
suggest that the public is indifferent to indigenous rights and may also weaken 
indigenous peoples’ special relationship with state transitional and historical 
justice.11 
To illustrate the very different doctrinal contours of indigenous legal 
frameworks and the consequences of invoking indigenous justice claims, it is 
useful to reconsider President Tsai’s official apology: 
I know that even now, there are some around us who see no need 
to apologize. But that is the most important reason why I am 
representing the government to issue this apology today. To see 
what was unfair in the past as a matter of course, or to treat the 
pain of other ethnic peoples as an unavoidable part of human 
development, this is the first mindset that we, standing here today, 
 
9  Period of authoritarian rule means the period from August 15, 1945 to November 6, 1992. See Cujin 
Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaoli (促進轉型正義條例) [Act on Promoting Transitional Justice] (promulgated by 
the Executive Yuan, Dec. 27, 2017, effective Dec. 27, 2017), art. 3, ¶ 1, FAWUBU QUANGUO FAGUI ZILIAOKU 
(法務部全國法規資料庫) [LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA]. 
10  Yabung & Chia-rong Hsu, Transitional Justice Bill Unhook Indigenous Peoples, TITV DAILY NEWS 
(July 28, 2016), http://titv.ipcf.org.tw/news-22791. 
11 Vanessa Lai, Women dui xiaoying xiangyuanmin daoqian lenggan (我們對小英向原民道歉冷感) 
[We felt apathetic towards Xiaoying’s apology to indigenous peoples], MATATAIWAN (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.matataiwan.com/2016/08/03/country-people-reconciliation-president-tsai-indigenous-
aboriginal/. 
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resolve to change and overturn.12 
In order to construct a solid foundation for achieving indigenous 
transitional and historical justice, it is in the best interests of both indigenous 
peoples and the general public to explore the sources of indigenous justice. 
Until this issue is essentially resolved, the existing uncertainty about 
reconciliation with indigenous peoples will continue. 
Based on the foregoing discussions, this paper aims to focus on the 
essential characteristics of indigenous justice against the successive alien 
regimes. This paper begins by introducing the historical origins between 
indigenous peoples and external forces in Taiwan. The historical non-
recognition of indigenous sovereign status and the lack of legal entitlement to 
indigenous land both have gradually devastated indigenous peoples and social 
structures. Next, this paper examines the dominant relationship maneuvered 
by successive nation-states to gain control over indigenous peoples. 
Following this, the paper continues to discuss the influences brought by 
indigenous movements upon the national apology delivered on August 1, 2016. 
Despite the fact that the national apology may have broken new ground in the 
government’s relationship with indigenous peoples, the common 
understanding of transitional justice has caused significant bitterness and 
frustration among indigenous peoples. Lastly, the paper dwells upon the core 
significance of indigenous justice, which differs from transitional justice in 
Taiwan. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The indigenous peoples of Taiwan are an enigma to most other 
Taiwanese.13 According to the oral traditions of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, 
they have inhabited the island of Taiwan since the beginning of time. 14 
Anthropological research regarding the origins of Taiwan indigenous peoples 
 
12  See Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee, supra note 
6. 
13  For the purpose of this paper, I refer to Taiwanese, according to language and time of migration to 
Taiwan, as including the Fulao language groups, the Hakka language groups, and the Mandarin language 
groups. 
14 For general discussion on the ancestory myths and legends of indigenous peoples, see Hui-ping Liu, 
Imagination and Fact: The Historical Memory and Race Group Approval about Taiwan Aborigines “Brother 
First Ancestor Myth and Legends”, 6 TAIWAN LITERARY STUD. 12, 12–18 (2008). 
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is inconclusive and controversial.15 
It is worth noting that President Tsai’s Indigenous Policy first 
emphasized that “Indigenous peoples are the original owner of Taiwan,” and 
followed with the announcement to deliver a national apology. The message 
brought about a debate on the actual meaning of “original owner.” However, 
it is not possible to understand the contemporary situation of Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples without knowing the history of indigenous peoples, and 
the transformations of indigenous status over time. Consequently, one must 
retrace the historical interactions between successive colonial powers and 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. 
Taiwan is an immigrant state like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United States. Since time immemorial, and long before foreign settlers and 
subsequent immigrants started arriving in Taiwan about five centuries ago, 
various indigenous peoples already lived in Taiwan.16 As a result, indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan and those in other nation-states share a common history of 
oppression by different colonizers. “Discovery and conquest” and enormous 
settlements have substantially displaced indigenous peoples from their 
traditional lands. Thus, indigenous peoples gradually had to either assimilate 
into the settlers’ society or move to remote areas. 
In the context of U.S. law, American Indians are recognized as 
sovereign nations having a direct relationship with U.S. federal government.17 
For populations like the American Indians in the United States, “indigenous 
peoples” is a term with political characteristics rather than mere racial 
characteristics.18 In comparsion, does the status of “original owner” equate 
with an American Indian sovereign nation in the Taiwanese context? 
Moreover, does the concept of indigenous peoples situate them differently 
 
15  Cheng-hwa Tsang, Once Again on the Austronesian Origin and Dispersal, 3 AUSTRONESIAN STUD. 
87, 88–91 (2012). 
16  Id. at 99–101. 
17  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832). The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed American 
Indian tribes’ status as governments with retained inherent powers to regulate their members and territory. 
Also see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). The Court denominated Indian tribes “domestic 
dependent nations” based on their status as unique sovereign entities within the U.S. legal framework. For 
further scholarly discussions, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE 
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 54–63 (1987). 
18  See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–55 (1974); see also William C. Canby, Jr., The Concept 
of Equality in Indian Law, 85 WASH. L. REV. 13, 16 (2010) (arguing “The Court upheld the preference, 
holding that the preference did not constitute racial or ethnic discrimination, but was a political classification 
reflecting the relationship between the federal government and recognized Indian tribes”). 
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from other mainstream or minority groups in the legal framework of Taiwan? 
Briefly speaking, the history of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples is one of 
colonization and exploitation by external forces. Most non-indigenous 
Taiwanese believe that the development of indigenous peoples has progressed 
along with mainstream Taiwanese society through centuries of colonization. 
Indigenous history in Taiwan has been written largely from this inaccurate, 
non-indigenous point of view. History is a process of re-presentation of the 
past.19  Thus, it is not possible to understand indigenous peoples in their 
contemporary setting without gaining knowledge of their history as it has been 
formed and shaped by the indigenous experience with western colonization. 
Traditionally, the existence of indigenous peoples in Taiwan was not 
given sufficient attention by the public authority or society in general.20 Prior 
to contact with colonial settlers, indigenous territories were under the sole 
control of Formosa indigenous peoples. First named Ihla Formosa by 
Portuguese mariners, Taiwan has been colonized by the Dutch (1624-1662), 
the Spanish (1626-1642), Zheng Cheng-Gong (1662-1683), the Qing dynasty 
(1663-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945), and the Republic of China (1945 to 
the present).21 Today Taiwan is claimed by the People’s Republic of China, 
the Republic of China, and Taiwanese Minnan-speaking nationalists who seek 
independence. Not surprisingly, laws of “discovery,” “conquest,” and “terra 
nullius” were used to effectuate dispossession not only in the New World, but 
also in Taiwan. 22  Colonial governments simply used these concepts in 
 
19  This colonial perception of aboriginal history is also reflected in the Native Americans’ experiences. 
“The history of Native American has been fundamentally colored by the perceptions—or the belief systems 
if you will—of the writers. . . . Whether written as a story of conquest, exploitation, paternalism, or greed, it 
deserves a better story. It requires a far richer understanding of the complex nature of human cultures, and 
equally, of the fundamentals of economic and societal change than we have possessed.” SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 1 (Terry L. Anderson et al. eds., 2006). 
20  See, e.g., Danxin dangan (淡新檔案, Danxin Archives), Taiwan Sōtokufu dangan (臺灣總督府檔
案, Archives of the Governor-General Office of Taiwan). Two major colonial historical documents of Taiwan, 
mainly contributed to the collections and records of non-indigenous social, cultural and legal developments; 
rarely devoted to the indigenous peoples. It was not until the latter half of the Japanese occupation, the 
colonial government began to investigate the traditional indigenous social, cultural, and legal structures. 
21 FAZHAN ZHONG DE TAIWAN SHANDI XINGZHENG (發展中的臺灣山地行政) [PROGRESSING TAIWAN 
MOUNTAIN ADMINISTRATION] 20–23 (Taiwanshengzhengfu mingzhengting (臺灣省政府民政廳) [Taiwan 
Provincial Government Civil Division] ed., 1961). 
22  Henrietta Harrison, Changing Nationalities, Changing Ethnicities: Taiwan Indigenous Villages in 
the Years after 1946, in IN SEARCH OF THE HUNTERS AND THEIR TRIBES: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND 
CULTURE OF THE TAIWAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 53 (David Faure ed., 2001) [hereinafter IN SEARCH OF THE 
HUNTERS]. According to Harrison, the Japanese military counselor C.W. Le Gendre, an American, provided 
the Japanese government with an idea of “fandi wuzhu lun (蕃地無主論, Savage land is without the lord)”, 
which is based on the American colonial experiences, to justify military action. 
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affiliation with naming to revoke or extinguish indigenous land ownership. 
Recognizing these historical events, this paper argues that we should look 
beyond restrictive understandings of indigenous naming and, instead, 
reconstruct the special status of indigenous peoples in the context of 
transitional and historical justice in Taiwan. 
III. IDENTIFICATION AS “SAVAGES” UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 
Prior to the sixteenth century, Taiwan was isolated and virtually 
unknown to the outside world. From the viewpoint of the new settlers, Taiwan 
was unoccupied and without a sovereign government. The European 
occupation of Taiwan in the mid-sixteenth century marked the end of pre-
contact era and the beginning of a new era in which Taiwan entered the 
international community. 
Under pre-Japanese colonial regimes, indigenous peoples could coexist 
as autonomous political communities. In the early contact periods, it was 
never considered an option to treat indigenous societies as though they did not 
exist. Both Dutch and Spanish settlements, from the earliest efforts in the early 
seventeenth century, depended on successful intercourse with indigenous 
peoples. Such intercourse was often amicable and mutually beneficial.23 The 
interactions between settlers and indigenous peoples throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries facilitated mostly peaceful coexistence. 
After periodic outbreaks of violence and warfare, relations would be 
temporarily restored through treaty-like agreements.24 
It was not until the arrival of Japanese colonists in the late-nineteenth 
century that a formal, central political power was established on the island. At 
the commencement of Japanese rule there existed, broadly speaking, two 
kinds of inhabitants: those of Chinese origin whose ancestors had immigrated 
from the Chinese mainland since the seventeenth century, and indigenous 
peoples who were referred to in historical documents as “savages” or 
“barbarians.”25 
 
23  See THE FORMOSAN ENCOUNTER: NOTES ON FORMOSA’S ABORIGINAL SOCIETY: A SELECTION OF 
DOCUMENTS FROM DUTCH ARCHIVAL SOURCES 48–50 (Leonard Blussé et al. eds., 1999). 
24  Id. at 49–53. 
25  See Tay-sheng Wang, Indigenous Peoples in the Legal History of Taiwan: Being a Special Ethnic 
Group, Territory and Legal Culture, 44 NTU L. J. 1639, 1660–61 (2015). 
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The reception of western law in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule 
initiated the institutionalization of indigenous peoples. Japanese colonial 
policies toward indigenous peoples were justified as being “for their own good” 
and to promote protection, assimilation, and recognition. 26 In actual practice, 
indigenous peoples were classified into different levels of savage status: 
shengfan (生番, raw savages), huafan (化番, semi-sinicized savages), and 
shufan (熟番, cooked savages).27 The perception of indigenous peoples as 
savages, in practical effect, provided “legal” grounds for actions by the 
Japanese government. After seizing sovereignty over Taiwan, the Japanese 
colonial government adopted the “discovery doctrine,” proposed by the U.S. 
Consul James W. Davidson, and declared indigenous territories terra 
nullius.28 Thus, Japan dispossessed indigenous peoples of their lands and 
declared them state-owned. According to the Sōtokufu Counselor Mochiji 
Rokusaburou, “When the Empire acquired the sovereignty of Taiwan, these 
savage peoples (shengfan) never submitted to the authority; they continued to 
rebel against the Empire’s sovereign power. The State has the legal right to 
subdue these defiant savages, and this right is within the State’s jurisdiction 
and sovereign power.”29 
Territorial acquisition of indigenous lands through forced cession was 
intended but did not come to pass. What, then, actually happened to the 
indigenous territory? What truly occurred can be described as a process of 
institutional solidification of State laws. The Governor-General Office of 
Taiwan promulgated two major laws in managing indigenous lands: (1) 
Guanyou linye ji zhangnao zhizaoye qudi guize (官有林野及樟腦製造業取
締 規 則 , Regulations of National Forests Management and Camphor 
Production) of October 1896, and (2) Law No. Seven: Provisions of 
Occupying Savage Lands (蕃地占有ニ關スル律令) of February 1900.30 
These two laws officially declared and affirmed that indigenous lands were 
state-owned. The laws denied indigenous rights to land unless proven with a 
 
26  See Harry J. Lamley, Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism, in 
TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 201–60 (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 2006). Lamley classified Japanese occupation 
into four periods: 1) Annexation and Armed Resistance (1895-1897); 2) Colonial Reforms and Taiwanese 
Accommodation (1897-1915); 3) Colonial Governance and Peacetime Experiences (1915-1936); and 4) War 
time (1937-1945). 
27  See Wang, supra note 25, at 1661. 
28  QI-YI FU, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 205 (1992) (Chinese). 
29 RECORDS OF SAVAGE ADMINISTRATION 185–86 (Governor-General Office of Taiwan ed., Jin-tian 
Chen et al. trans., 1997). 
30  Id. at 125–26. 
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title deed31 and restrained Han peoples from obtaining indigenous lands.32 
Law No. Seven stands squarely for the proposition handed down in three 
Western landmark cases of indigenous jurisprudence: America’s Johnson v. 
McIntosh,33 Canada’s Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,34 and Australia’s 
Mabo35 decision. These three cases all described aboriginal title to land as 
inalienable to any party other than the Crown. 
Alternatively, in line with general colonial policies towards indigenous 
peoples, the “Comment on the Savages Policy” (蕃政問題ニ關スル意見) 
stated that, “We only talk about savage lands here. The Empire sees savage 
lands, but no savage peoples. Savage lands must be regarded from an 
economic point of view and managed with financial strategies.” 36 
Accordingly, it was in the interests of the colonial government to maintain the 
savage status of the indigenous peoples who might otherwise have laid claim 
to ownership of Taiwan’s richest natural resources. Identifying indigenous 
peoples as savages gave the colonial government the right to occupy their land. 
This was a widely-shared ideology among the major colonial powers at that 
time.37 Like the British colonizers’ view of aboriginal land in Australia as 
terra nullius, the Japanese government perceived the savages of Taiwan as 
non-legal entities lacking knowledge of property ownership, and claimed their 
lands as government property. 
In sum, the framework of National Forests Regulations and Law No. 
 
31  “官有林野及樟腦製造業取締規則第一条には、「所有権ヲ証明スヘキ地券又ハ其他 ノ確證
ナキ山林原野ハ総テ官有トス.” 
32  YOSABURO TAKEKOSHI, JAPANESE RULE IN FORMOSA 211 (1996). Yosaburo stated, “In February 
1900, the authorities promulgated Law No. 7. This law states that nobody except savages may, under any 
pretext whatever, occupy or use any portion of the Savage Territory, nor lay any claim whatever to it.” Id. 
33  Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 567–69 (1823). 
34  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.). 
35  Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
36  Governor-General Office of Taiwan, supra note 29, at 180 (“持地參事官ノ蕃政問題ニ關スル意
見 – 予ハ茲ニ蕃地問題ト云フ何トナレバ帝國主權ノ眼中蕃地アリテ蕃人ナケレバナリ蕃地問題
ハ宜シク經濟的見地ヨリ解決スルヲ要ス而シテ其經營ハ須ラク財政的方策ナラザルベカラズ蓋シ
國家諸般ノ問題其歸スル所ハ皆經濟的財政的問題ニアラザルハ莫キノミナラズ殖民地經營ニ至リ
テハ特ニ經濟的財政的見地ヨリ諸般問題ヲ解決スルヲ必要トスレバナリ.”) 
37  Governor-General Office of Taiwan, supra note 29, at 180–81 (“持地參事官ノ蕃政問題ニ關スル
意見 –蕃地問題ハ國家問題ナリ殖民地經營問題ナリ予輩ハ人道問題トシテ之ヲ解決セント欲スル
モズ這ハ世ノ宗教家慈善家ノ本務ナリ予輩ハ國權問題トシテ解決セント欲スルモノニアラズ何ト
ナレバ禽獸ニ均シキ彼レ蕃人ニ對シテ皇化ノ普及國威ノ宣揚ヲ絕叫スルノ必要ナケレバナリ。蕃
地問題ハ實地問題ナリ … 夫レ法律上ヨ蕃人蕃地ヲ解決スルハ甚ダ難カラズ何トナレバ國法上蕃
人ナク蕃地ナケレバナリ又社會上ヨリ蕃人蕃地ヲ解決ルモ容易ナリ何トナレバ劣等人種ノ優等人
種ト相接觸スルセ其生存競爭ノ結果ハ劣等人種ガ優等人種ノ為メニ族滅セラレ若クハ同化セラ
ルヽニ歸スルハ歷史ノ證明スル所ナレバナリ.”). 
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Seven shows that the colonial government considered indigenous peoples as 
“uncivilized savages” and “without land tenure systems.” Consequently, the 
possibility that indigenous peoples could claim their legal rights was out of 
the question and ignored by the colonial government. 
IV. LEGAL FICTION OF MOUNTAIN COMPATRIOTS UNDER R.O.C. 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
In 1945, upon Japan’s surrender to the Allies at the end of World War 
II, Taiwan reverted to Chinese (Republic of China, R.O.C.) control. Following 
the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949, the R.O.C. regime led by the 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) General Chiang Kai-shek fled to 
Taiwan and announced the imposition of martial law on May 19, 1949. From 
that point in 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was under KMT authoritarian rule.38 The 
KMT’s indigenous policy was the direct heir of its totalitarian Japanese 
predecessor, and indeed surpassed the latter in planning and implementing its 
goal of assimilating indigenous people. For the purpose of eliminating the 
peoplehood of indigenous peoples, the R.O.C. government issued an order to 
rename Gaoshanzu (高山族, High-mountain peoples) as the Shanditongbao 
( 山地同胞 , mountain compatriots). 39  The government used the term 
“mountain compatriots” to emphasize that they are just like common peoples, 
but also to feature both their economically-disadvantaged status and 
residential remoteness. A basic formula can be understood as, “you 
(Shanditongbao) are strangely different, I (the government) came to make you 
normal like the Hans.” In other words, the government manipulated the idea 
of compatriot under the disguise of policy discrimination for the purpose of 
assimilation. Nonetheless, the underlying reason for the renaming was to 
justify the superiority of the Han majority and strengthen their dominant 
relationship over indigenous peoples. 
In its early authoritarian rule, the KMT government’s overall goal was 
“shandi pingdihua” (山地平地化, make the mountains like the plains)—in 
other words, to assimilate indigenous peoples. The government promoted its 
overarching goal of assimilation primarily through three objectives: 1) to 
 
38  By 1987, in response to the changing political context, the R.O.C. government lifted martial law 
and moved towards democratization. See EXECUTIVE YUAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 88–89 
(2016), http://ws.ey.gov.tw/001/Eyupload/oldfile/UserFiles/YB%202016%20all%20100dpi.pdf. 
39  TAIWANSHEG GONGBAOZHONG YOUGUAN YUANZHUMIN FAGUIZHENGLING HUIBIAN 1 (臺灣省公報
中有關原住民法規政令彙編 1) [COMPILATION OF INDIGENOUS REGULATIONS IN THE TAIWAN PROVINCIAL 
GAZETTE VOL. 1] 58 (Bao-yu Fu et al. eds., 1998). 
 
July 2019 Conceptualizing Indigenous Historical Justice     663 
 
 
create a national outlook through promoting the Mandarin language; 2) to 
create an economic outlook by teaching production skills; and 3) to create 
good customs through emphasizing hygiene.40 In 1951, the Taiwan Provincial 
government launched a series of assimilation policies titled, Shandi renmin 
shenghuo gaijin yundong (山地人民生活改進運動 , Mountain Peoples’ 
Lifestyle Improvement Movement). These policies served as the focal point 
of Shandi shizheng yaodian (山地施政要點 , Key Points of Mountain 
Administration) which affirmed the core values of integration and 
expediency.41 As observed by Henrietta Harrison: 
The aim of these policies . . . appeared to be similar to Qing 
dynasty policies which encouraged sinicization (hanhua). . . . 
This movement aimed to change language, clothing, food, 
housing, daily life, and customs. Many of the practices addressed 
were ones which had long defined people as non-Han. . . . 
[W]hile campaigns to encourage an “economic outlook” were 
primarily intended to increase the material wealth of indigenous 
communities, they also addressed stereotypes of ethnic 
difference, and were thus part of the general assimilationist 
policy.42 
During the first fifty years under the Chinese Nationalist Party, the 
Taiwan government engaged in a series of inappropriate policies designed to 
control, subjugate, and assimilate indigenous peoples. Further, social science 
scholarship outlines the condition of Taiwan indigenous peoples as 
marginalized and largely disenfranchised in relation to the majority Chinese 
population. 43  The ethno-oriented study of indigenous peoples has led to 
important findings on issues of representation, 44  indigenous social 
 
40  TAIWANSHENG JINGWUCHU ( 臺灣省警務處 ) [POLICE DEPARTMENT OF TAIWAN PROVINCE], 
TAIWANSHENG SHANDI JINGZHENG YAOLAN (臺灣省山地警政要覽 ) [REVIEW OF THE TAIWAN POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION] 40–41 (1953). 
41 See Yao-feng Wu, The Evolution and Development of Taiwan’s Aboriginal Administration Policy, in 
THE PARTICIPATION REPORT OF CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL POLICY AND MINORITY CULTURES HOSTED BY 
THE EAST-WEST CENTER 89–90 (1986). 
42 See Harrison, supra note 22, at 67–68. For detail information on the implementation measures of 
Main Action Guidelines of Aboriginal Administration, see Taiwanshengzhengfu mingzhengting, supra note 
21, at 24–26. 
43 See Harrison, supra note 22, at 78; see also Kai-yiu Chan, Costumes, Beads and Business in Pingtung: 
The Changing Economic Life of the Paiwan and the Rukai, in IN SEARCH OF THE HUNTERS, supra note 22, at 
130–32. 
44  See MELISSA J. BROWN, IS TAIWAN CHINESE?: THE IMPACT OF CULTURE, POWER, AND MIGRATION 
ON CHANGING IDENTITIES 13–16, 223 (2004). 
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movements,45 and ethnic relations.46 Even so, there is still little research 
regarding indigenous jurisprudence, polity characteristics, and their 
relationship with the Taiwanese government. 
By maneuvering the term “shanbao” in land administration, the R.O.C. 
government under the KMT administration did not recognize indigenous 
peoples as the holders of legal title to their lands. The R.O.C. government did 
not take the same position as the Japanese colonial government to treat 
indigenous peoples as non-legal subjects without legal personality. Rather, the 
R.O.C. government considered “shanbao” as “citizens of distinctive lifestyles” 
who were inferior in essence and the R.O.C. continued attempts to convert 
them through assimilation and sinicization (hanhua).47 Initially, indigenous 
land administration under R.O.C. continued former Japanese land 
management systems, declared indigenous lands as national land through the 
power of eminent domain, and had taken land from indigenous peoples 
without compensation. 
V. FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION 
Starting in the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s, indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan have endeavored to revive their rights and the R.O.C. 
government has been increasingly engaged in indigenous social reforms. 
Since 1983, communications between the government authority, mainstream 
society, and indigenous peoples have allowed the Taiwan government to 
gradually detect the bottom line of aboriginal rights in the political framework 
of Taiwan.48 In other words, the government is finally beginning to realize 
that the public authority and mainstream society have repeatedly failed to 
recognize indigenous rights. After four constitutional amendments in the 
1990s, the political status as indigenous collectivity finally acquired 
constitutional recognition with the enactment of the Indigenous Article in 
 
45  See Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines, Report of the Human Rights Situation of Taiwan’s Indigenous 
Peoples, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF ASIA 357–72 (Robert H. Barnes et al. eds., 1995). 
46  See Cheng-Feng Shih, Jiangou taiwan zhengzhishi de changshi: you creole dao mestizo de kenzhi 
shehui (建構台灣政治史的嘗試—由 creole 到 mestizo 的墾殖社會) [An Attempt to Construct Taiwan’s 
Political History], in THE TAIWAN NATIONALISM 23–26 (2003). 
47 Heng-chan Ku, Writing without a Subject: A Historical Survey of the Aboriginal Discourse in Taiwan 
after WWII (1945-1955), 9 MONUMENTA TAIWANICA 83, 93–99 (2014). 
48  Pei-Lun Chen Chang, A Theory of Affirmative Action for Group Development and Indigenous 
Peoples, 47 J. PHIL. STUDY PUB. AFF. 1, 35–37 (2013). 
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1997.49 
In 2000, the DPP won the presidential election, which replaced KMT’s 
long-term rule and marked the first party alternation in the history of Taiwan. 
The salient features of DPP’s policy advancing indigenous rights included 
official announcements of a “new partnership,”50 including a “government-
to-government relationship” with indigenous peoples, and the legislative 
enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law. 51  These political 
commitments restructured official relationships with indigenous peoples. This 
period signified the high point of indigenous sovereign existence.52 However, 
social and political contexts at that time revealed ordinary peoples’ negligence 
and lack of concern towards indigenous rights, and the political structure of 
party opposition. Additionally, the above-mentioned political commitments 
are rooted in the common law regime’s Indigenous/White relationship. 
Nevertheless, domestic normative and structural difficulties reduce the 
likelihood that the government-to-government relationship will be 
internalized and institutionalized in the legal framework of Taiwan. 
Consequently, applying these principles and concepts to the implementation 
of Taiwanese Indigenous policies would come up against political, social, and 
cultural obstacles. After all, during the DPP’s rule, a “government-to-
government relationship” with indigenous peoples never came into practice. 
The enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (原住民族基本
法 , Yuanzhuminzu jibenfa) in January 2005 represented a milestone 
accomplishment for indigenous rights. The Basic Law seems out of step with 
 
49  “The State shall, in accordance with the will of indigenous peoples, safeguard the status and political 
participation of indigenous peoples. The State shall also guarantee and provide assistance and encouragement 
for indigenous education, culture, transportation, water conservation, health and medical care, economic 
activity, land, and social welfare, measures for which shall be established by law.” ZHONGHUA MINGUO 
XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN (中華民國憲法增修條文) [ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE ROC] art. 10, ¶ 5, translated in https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/95. 
50  The New Partnership between Indigenous Peoples and Taiwanese Government (原住民族和台灣
政府新的夥伴關係) was signed on September 10, 1999, between eleven major Indigenous representatives 
and the DPP Presidential Candidacy, Mr. Chen Shui-bian. These campaign promises were further refined and 
discussed in the 2000 DPP White Paper on Indigenous Policy. On October 19, 2002, President Chen 
reconfirmed the treaty; thus becoming an official document which highlights the guiding principles of the 
government platform. 
51  Yapasuyongu Poiconu, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Taiwan 
Indigenous Rights Protection, 2 TAIWAN INDIGENOUS STUD. REV. 141, 164–65 (2007). 
52  Ta-chuan Sun, Bei bangjia de zhuti? Taiwan yuanzhuminzu fazheng cunzai de fazhan (被綁架的主
體？—臺灣原住民族法政存在的發展) [A Kidnapped Subject? Legal Existence Development of Taiwan 
Indigenous People], 20 FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH 46, 52 (2008). 
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the bulk of traditional Taiwanese law, because it singles out a segment of 
society on the basis of peoplehood.53 In terms of land management, the Basic 
Law removes significant portions of indigenous property from the commercial 
mainstream and gives government officials a degree of discretion that is not 
only intrusive but also offensive to other members of the society. For example, 
the exercise of indigenous hunting rights within the national parks has created 
tension between groups advocating the preservation of indigenous culture and 
environmental conservation groups.54 Furthermore, the Basic Law requires 
that any economic or development activity within indigenous lands proposed 
by the government or a non-indigenous party must be approved by, and share 
its benefits with, the local indigenous community.55 The Basic Law has been 
criticized in every aspect. The majority of opponents tend to be non-
indigenous people who demand that the Basic Law be abolished because it 
violates normative standards of equality. 
Taking one of the bylaws as an example to illustrate general public’s 
resistance towards indigenous rights protection, specifically the protections 
for the traditional intellectual creations of indigenous peoples. Article 13 of 
the Basic Law stipulates that “The government shall protect indigenous 
peoples’ traditional biological diversity knowledge and intellectual creations, 
and promote the development thereof. The related issues shall be provided for 
by the laws.”56 Nonetheless, it was not until eight years later that the bylaw 
was finally promulgated by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in January 
2015.57 Two years later the first exclusive right was granted by the aforesaid 
 
53 Chris C. C. Huang, Xianfa jieshi yu yuanzhumin quanli (憲法解釋與原住民權利) [Constitutional 
Interpretation and Indigenous Rights], in XIANFA JIESHI ZHI LILUN YU SHIWU DILIUJI (憲法解釋之理論與實
務第六輯) [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION VI] 430–31 (Fort Fu-Te Liao ed., 
2009). 
54 Indigenous persons may undertake the following non-profit seeking activities in indigenous peoples’ 
regions and the sea areas be promulgated by the central indigenous competent authority: 1) Hunting wild 
animals; 2) Collecting wild plants and fungus; 3) Collecting minerals, rocks and soils; 4) Utilizing water 
resources. Yuanzhuminzu jibenfa (原住民族基本法 ) [The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law], FAWUBU 
QUANGUO FAGUI ZILIAOKU (法務部全國法規資料庫) [LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA], art 19, ¶ 1. 
55  When governments or private parties engage in land development, resource utilization, ecology 
conservation and academic research in indigenous land, tribe and their adjoin-land which owned by 
governments, they shall consult and obtain consent by indigenous peoples or tribes, even their participation, 
and share benefits with indigenous people. Id. art. 21, ¶ 1. 
56 Yuanzhuminzu jibenfa (原住民族基本法) [The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law[, FAWUBU QUANGUO 
FAGUI ZILIAOKU (法務部全國法規資料庫) [LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA], 
art 13. 
57  Yuanzhuminzu chuantong zhihui chuangzuo baohu shishi banfa (原住民族傳統智慧創作保護實
施辦法) [Implementation Measures for the Protection of Traditional Wisdom of Aboriginal People], COUNCIL 
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competent authority after all.58 
The government officials held not only a negative attitude but also an 
offensive position towards the implementation of the Basic Law and its related 
regulations. One of the most recent controversial issues was the revocation of 
Thao peoples’ traditional territorial demarcation in Nantou County’s Yuchih 
Township. The issue was regarding the application of Article 21 of the Basic 
Law in a planned resort and other development projects. Nantou county 
government, Yuchih township office and land developers filed an 
administrative appeal against the Council of Indigenous Peoples’ decision to 
reinstate the territory. 59  The Executive Yuan’s Petition and Appeals 
Committee ruled that the Thao peoples’ traditional territorial demarcation is 
invalid because of the procedural flaw and that due process of law is required 
in the demarcation mechanism.60 One response to these offensive arguments 
is illustrated by President Tsai’s remarks in a national apology to indigenous 
peoples: 
Today, we have an Indigenous Peoples Basic Law that is quite 
advanced. However, government agencies have not given 
sufficient weight to this law. Our actions have not been fast 
enough, comprehensive enough or sound enough. For this, I 
apologize to the indigenous peoples on behalf of the 
government.61 
Indigenous rights to land and natural resources are entrenched in the 
Basic Law,62 and the government is obliged to delimit the area of indigenous 
land for the application of indigenous right to consultation and informed 
consent.63 Alternatively, indigenous peoples’ claim to reinstate the traditional 
 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: LAWS AND REGULATIONS RETRIEVING SYSTEM, 
https://law.apc.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=GL000210. 
58  Press Release, Council of Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=35AE118732EB6BAF&DID=0C3331F0EBD318C28
A63E32117CF322C. 
59  Administrative Appeal Decision Taisuzhi No. 1080162600, Petitions and Appeals Committee, 
Executive Yuan (Jan. 25, 2019) (Taiwan). 
60  For a relevant report, see Ann Maxon, Council Promises to Reinstate Thao Territory, TAIPEI TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2019), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/01/29/2003708853. 
61  See Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee, supra note 
6. 
62  The government recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources. The Indigenous 
Peoples Basic Law, supra note 54, art. 20, ¶ 1. 
63  The central indigenous competent authority shall stipulate the regulations for delimiting the area of 
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territorial lands is a statutory right endowed with constitutional protection. In 
the absence of adequate official support, fuller political enforcement is needed 
to effectuate indigenous rights as envisioned in the Basic Law. 
The foregoing discussions have shown that the Japanese and Chinese 
states had differing policies, but both were aimed toward assimilating 
indigenous peoples. One of the first policies for managing indigenous issues 
of Japanese government was premised on the belief that indigenous peoples 
would have to be educated and turned into small farmers.64 Under the R.O.C. 
(KMT government) control, the forces of assimilation were found in 
education programs, land redistribution, and efforts to incorporate indigenous 
peoples into the market-based economy. Indigenous languages, cultures, 
religions, and values were discouraged, and Chinese cultures were encouraged. 
Later on, the KMT government gave way to more multicultural models of 
national culture and community, but the emphasis remained on acceptance of 
and participation in national culture, political institutions, and laws. The 
values and institutions of indigenous peoples, however, were generally 
ignored in the earlier Japanese unified model and the latter KMT multicultural 
national models. Neither the unified nor the multicultural national model had 
a place for indigenous sui generis status. 
Understandably, the process of building Taiwan as a modern state had 
direct consequences for indigenous peoples. The modern logic of both Japan 
and R.O.C. was to universalize society through assimilationist policies toward 
indigenous peoples living in its domain. The goal of the state was to 
incorporate indigenous peoples and their lands into the dominant state and 
society, so they would no longer remain on the cultural and territorial frontiers 
of Taiwan. In essence, the State’s adopted theory of species evolution and 
cultural class differentiation that applied to the national legal framework, 
began with the defamation of indigenous culture so as to establish the 
superiority of the dominant peoples; as a result, indigenous difference has 
been stigmatized as primitive and inferior. The truth is, there exists an 
unfinished story behind the government’s naming of indigenous peoples. 
Although successive ruling regimes have developed different dominating 
 
indigenous land, tribe and their adjoin-land which owned by governments, procedures to consult, to obtain 
consent by indigenous peoples or tribes and to participate and compensation to their damage by restrictions 
in preceding three paragraph. Id. art. 21, ¶ 4. 
64  See TAKEKOSHI, supra note 32, at 216. Japanese authority said, as noted by Yosaburo, “that all 
hunting was contrary to the principles of humanity, and the savages should, therefore, turn their attention 
instead to tilling the land and growing corn and potatoes. In this way the Government hopes to reduce them 
to impotence and force them to take up gentler ways of living.” 
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structures over indigenous peoples, the underlying colonization goal has never 
changed. Japanese colonial government identified indigenous peoples as 
savages to exclude and eliminate their potential legal claims. The R.O.C. 
renamed indigenous peoples mountain compatriots in order to eliminate 
indigenous peoplehood and to include indigenous issues within the sociolegal 
category of race. 
Due to this lack of knowledge on the aforementioned indigenous 
relationships with State, indigenous rights claims are often analyzed through 
the lens of race-based affirmative actions. It is worth bringing the 
Interpretation No. 719 of the Judicial Yuan (R.O.C.) into discussions. J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 719 is the case concerning the mandatory requirement for 
government-procurement-winning bidders to employ a certain percentage of 
indigenous people. This requirement was challenged by non-indigenous 
petitioners, including Sinon Corporation, Next Media Ltd., Apply Daily Ltd., 
and Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation.65 The issue under constitutional 
review is whether it is unconstitutional to require a government-procurement-
winning bidder hiring more than one hundred employees to recruit a certain 
percentage of indigenous people, and to make the substituting payment for 
failing to comply.66 A short version of the issue of law in J.Y. Interpretation 
No. 719 can be understood as whether an indigenous employment preference 
has constitutional legality and legitimacy. 
The Constitutional Court in the J.Y. Interpretation No. 719 declared that:  
[The requirements] are not inconsistent with the principle of 
equality under Article 7, and the principle of proportionality 
under Article 23 of the Constitution and are consistent with the 
constitutional protections of the right to property, and the right of 
individuals to freely operate business, the essence of the right to 
work, under Article 15 of the Constitution.67  
By focusing on the principle of race-based affirmative actions, the 
Constitutional Court reasoned that “the objective of the regulations in dispute 
 
65  Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 719 (司法院大法官解釋第  719 號  解釋 ) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 719] (Apr. 18, 2014) (Case Concerning Mandatory Requirement for Government 
Procurement Winning Bidders to Employ a Certain Percentage of Indigenous People) [hereinafter 
Interpretation No. 719]. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
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is to maintain a paramount public interest and therefore is justifiable.”68 
Additionally, the State is charged with the obligation to protect, assist, and 
promote the development of indigenous peoples based on article 10, 
paragraph 12 of the Additional Articles of the R.O.C. Constitution69 along 
with the support from ILO Convention No. 169 (article 20, paragraph 1)70 and 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (article 
21, forepart of paragraph 2).71 The Constitutional Court further reasoned that: 
There should be a reasonable connection between the differential 
treatment and the achieving of the objectives thereof. Since the 
level of the indigenous people’s education and professional skill 
is by and large relatively weak as opposed to the competitiveness 
of the job market, their living conditions are thus affected. The 
classification adopted by the regulations in dispute has therefore 
established a reasonable connection with the objectives 
anticipated to be achieved. Consequently, the regulations in 
dispute are not in conflict with the principle of equality under 
Article 7 of the Constitution.72 
Comparing with American jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Morton v. Mancari73 ruled that American Indian employment preferences 
were based on a political rather than racial classification. Instead of taking 
affirmative action as the basis of American Indian rights, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the sui generis of “Indianness” were the legal roots of tribes’ 
sovereign status.74 On the other hand, in J.Y. Interpretation No. 719, even 
though substantive equality doctrine recognizes indigenous people as a racial-
minority-disadvantaged classification, the privileging of indigenous sui 
generis status obscures the significant influences of racialization. 75  This 
 
68  Id. 
69  ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN (中華民國憲法增修條文 ) [ADDITIONAL 
ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROC] art. 10, ¶ 5, translated in 
https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/95. 
70  Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), at art. 20, ¶ 1 (June 27, 1989). 
71  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
72  Id. 
73  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
74  Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 958, 963–65 (2011). 
75  See Interpretation No. 719, supra note 65. The Constitutional Court indicated that, “Where there are 
several alternative measures by which the state may take to achieve the objective to protect, assist and 
promote the development of indigenous peoples, the measure adopted by the regulations in dispute to require 
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indigenous sui generis status can be understood by Addie C. Rolnick’s 
political classification doctrine, which emphasized that “Indian law focuses 
on the group rights of political entities, and racial scholarship focuses on the 
individual rights of racial minorities.”76 
It is agreed from the historical context as well as international law 
doctrines that indigenous sui generis status stemmed from their precontact 
existence as independent political entities. 77  In actuality, the concept, 
meaning, and legal status of the term “indigenous people” are unfamiliar, 
fragmentary, and incomplete for Taiwanese society. Yet most non-indigenous 
people continue to comprehend “indigenous peoples” through the imagined 
community depicted by national racial minorities’ policy. According to the 
foregoing discussions, it is the standpoint of this paper to emphasize that one 
of the main obstacles for the general public to differentiate indigenous justice 
from transitional justice is the knowledge gap in indigenous sui generis status. 
VI. CONCLUSION: REFRAMING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
More than 560,000 people78 living in Taiwan are descendants of the 
Austronesian people who had a rich, self-sufficient culture on the island until 
Europeans started arriving in the seventeenth century. These indigenous 
peoples established their own sovereignty and operated as an independent 
political entity. In 1895, these independent political entities were conquered 
by the Japanese Empire, and fifty years later they were annexed by the 
Republic of China.79 The successive changing of colonial regimes has had its 
toll on indigenous peoples and resulted in the loss of most of their lands. Ever 
 
that the award-winning bidder shall employ a certain percentage of indigenous people during the term of 
contract performance also constitutes one of such alternative measures. Nevertheless, given most of the 
available jobs are more short-term or require non-technical skills, it may be difficult to enhance the long-
term, stable employment opportunity and professional skills. Consequently, the state shall actively through 
substantive policies and measures realize the objective contemplated by the above-mentioned Amendment to 
the Constitution to protect indigenous peoples’ right to work, and regularly review and revise such policies 
and measures based on the time and environment of the state and the society, as well as the need for the 
protection over the indigenous people’s right to work.” 
76  See Rolnick, supra note 71, at 965.  
77  Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in 
Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173, 175–83 (2014). 
78  As of December 2018, demographic statistics of indigenous peoples is 565,561. See COUNCIL OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INDIGENOUS POPULATION STATISTICS, 
https://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/docDetail.html?CID=940F9579765AC6A0&DID=2D9680BFECBE80B612
B8800B244DD7F4. 
79 Awi Mona (Chih-Wei Tsai) & Scott Simon, Imagining First Nations: from Eeyou Istchee (Québec) 
to the Seediq and Truku on Taiwan, 47 ISSUES & STUD. 29, 49–51 (2011). 
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since Taiwan became a part of the R.O.C. in 1945, and particularly beginning 
in the 1970s, an indigenous movement has been underway, and indigenous 
peoples now want to regain control over their land and their right to govern 
themselves through the implementation of transitional and historical justice. 
Nevertheless, the most prominent obstacle to the implementation lies 
in the transitional justice framework itself. Indeed, the framework of 
transitional justice is originally devised to facilitate reconciliation in countries 
undergoing transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.80 Countries such 
as Greece in 1974, Argentina in 1983, Eastern Bloc of Europe in 1989, and 
the democratization of South Africa are common examples. In other words, 
the transitional justice framework is at least composed of a number of 
elements, i.e., an identified authoritarian rule and a specific period. In the 
context of Taiwan, the authoritarian rule refers to the R.O.C. regime under the 
Nationalist Party and the specific period means the period from August 15, 
1945, to November 6, 1992.81 In much of the indigenous justice claims, the 
core has two interlocking aspects: indigenous sui generis status and 
indigenous land justice.  
Enormous indigenous land loss began in the early twentieth century 
during the Japanese occupation. Given that R.O.C. was the successor to Japan, 
the R.O.C. government began exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan in 1945, 
after Japan surrendered at the end of World War II and took over public and 
private properties previously possessed by the Japanese colonial government, 
including indigenous lands. The core issue of indigenous law is whether 
indigenous peoples could bring the land loss claims against the R.O.C. 
government in the framework of transitional justice. Furthermore, as indicated 
above, the process of institutionalizing indigenous peoples while 
simultaneously ascribing inferior charcteristics to different indigenous groups 
comprised a racializing project aimed at eventually defining indigenous 
peoples out of existence. This truly is the dilemma of indigenous transitional 
justice. 
It is well-known that two common law countries, Australia and Canada, 
had their national apologies to indigenous peoples delivered in 2008. However, 
both countries had avoided using the term “transitional justice.” Instead they 
 
80  COURTNEY JUNG, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FOR 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN A NON-TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY (2009). 
81  Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, supra note 9, at art. 3, § 1. 
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adopted vague reconciliation mechanisms, such as apologies, reparations, 
truth commissions, and a series of commemorations, to address the historical 
injustices of Stolen Generations in Australia 82  and Indian Residential 
Schools.83 The question is, where did land claims go? 
Everything about indigenous peoples is inextricably interwoven with, 
and connected to, the land. In most of the “New World” modern states, 
indigenous struggle for land justice has largely been defined by the common 
law doctrine of “discovery and conquest” and the doctrine of “terra nullius.”84 
As a result, in the context of classic international law, the sovereign status of 
indigenous peoples was denied by a process of legal rationalization that is 
underpinned by the assumption that indigenous peoples were inferior and 
incapable of legal entitlements. 85  The foregoing illustrates that colonial 
experiences imposed on the indigenous peoples in the “New World” 
manifested some similarities to the colonization experienced by indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan. 
Both the Australian and Canadian examples have shown at the outset 
that there is no regime transition to legitimatize the sovereign and legal 
authority of indigenous peoples and their justice claims. In so doing, both 
states had structured a framework to divide indigenous justice claims into 
“land claims and sovereign assertion” and “non-sovereign claims and other 
justice demands.” Essentially speaking, as Jung observed, “Canadian 
government has attempted to use apologies and reparations to narrow the 
scope of government’s obligation and to shut down other indigenous 
demands.”86 In actuality, setting up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
to introspect and review the policy of Indian Residential Schools may be used 
to draw a line through the past and rationalize historical dispossession of 
indigenous lands. A similar situation can also be found in the Australian 
government’s disposition of aboriginal land claims. Although the doctrine of 
terra nullius had been declared null and void by the High Court in Mabo 
 
82  AUSTL. GOV’T, CLOSING THE GAP ON INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE: THE CHALLENGE FOR 
AUSTRALIA (Mar. 2009), http://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/ closing_the_gap.pdf. 
83 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N CAN., SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF CANADA (2015), http://caid.ca/TRCFinExeSum2015.pdf. 
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case,87 it had opened the gateway for the judicial intervention to narrow 
indigenous land rights.88 As a result, Austrailian aboriginal land claims were 
excluded from the transitional justice framework. 
In order to avoid the aforementioned dilemma, this paper argued that it 
is necessary to think outside the box, i.e., to think imaginatively, using new 
ideas instead of the traditional or expected legal framework. In its preamble, 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 
DRIPs) stated that “indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices 
as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, 
territories and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, 
their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests”, 
and affirmed that “all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating 
superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, 
religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally 
invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust.”89 It is clear that the UN 
DRIPs eradicates the legal fiction of indigenous inferiority denying the legal 
personality and subjectivity of indigenous peoples. In addition, the UN DRIPs 
emphasizes that the realization of indigenous justice relies upon reinstating 
the theoretical framework of historical justice. As I have summarized here, the 
UN DRIPs framework has sketched the outline of a theoretical framework that 
better captures the complexity of indigenous justice claims. With this 
conception of indigenous justice, it may further contribute to reframe and 
broaden the idea of transitional justice. 
In this article, it is evidenced that Taiwan, Canada, and Australia have 
all positioned their relationship with indigenous peoples without regime 
transition. On the other hand, this paper also signifies that the roots of injustice 
experienced by Taiwan indigenous peoples are much deeper and their impact 
lasts much further compared to the general one under the Act on Promoting 
Transitional Justice. This paper attempts to call attention to the risk of 
marginalization on indigenous justice implementations, whether it is 
transitional or historical. While the cultural pluralism has been embedded 
within the R.O.C. constitutional regime,90 a jurisprudence of hybridity is yet 
 
87  Mabo and Others v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
88  Yorta Yorta v. Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422 (Austl.). 
89  G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 71. 
90  ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN (中華民國憲法增修條文) [THE ADDITIONAL 
ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ROC] art. 10, ¶ 11 (1991) (“The State affirms cultural pluralism and 
shall actively preserve and foster the development of aboriginal languages and cultures.”). 
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to be established as a response to the implementation of indigenous 
transitional and historical justice. Among all other concerns, the key issue, this 
paper argues, lies in the knowledge gap on the nature of indigenous 
subjectivity. The majority views still reflect the notion that indigenous peoples 
are racial-minority disadvantaged groups, leading to the narrow vision of 
indigenous policy as subsidiary-oriented affirmative measures.91 
Thus far, the history of Taiwan is mostly written by the successive 
political sovereigns. Within these contexts, as this paper illustrated, 
indigenous peoples have gone through a series of colonial naming with 
political and legal implications, contributing to the racial projects for 
subordination. If we want to understand what transitional and historical justice 
can do for indigenous cultural survival, we should trace back the history of 
oppression and exploitation imposed upon indigenous peoples through 
colonization. 
The Executive Yuan has already submitted Yuanzhuminzu lishizhengyi 
ji quanlihuifu tiaoli caoan (原住民族歷史正義及權利回復條例草案 , 
Indigenous Peoples Historical Justice and Rights Restitution Bill) to the 
Legislative Yuan on May 10, 2018. 92  The Bill restructured the justice 
framework, extending the scope far back to the first contact, broadening the 
issues to human rights violations against indigenous peoples, and setting up 
an independent land claims commission.93 A major shift is needed in thinking 
about the operation of transitional justice. This paper has demonstrated that it 
is of greatest importance that the indigenous justice claims are necessarily tied 
to the issue of recognition of indigenous jurisprudence.  
Using this framework, Taiwan indigenous peoples can help redefine the 
way transitional and historical justice claims are viewed. Lastly, such changes 
will make it possible to address the complexity of indigenous justice demands 
and significantly enhance their chances in achieving mutual understandings 
and reconciliations in Taiwan. 
 
91  An exemplary legislation is Indigenous Peoples Employment Rights Protection Act, which adopts 
proportional recruitment principle to promote the employment of indigenous people. See Yuanzhuminzu 
gongzuoquan baozhangfa (原住民族工作權保障法) [Indigenous Peoples Employment Rights Protection 
Act] (promulgated and amended by the Council of Indigenous Peoples, Feb. 4, 2015, effective Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://law.apc.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=FL002069 (Taiwan). 
92  Press Release, The Executive Yuan, The Executive Yuan Will Pass the Draft of the Aboriginal 
Historical Justice and Rights Reply Ordinance (May 10, 2018), available at 
https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/8904e4c5-f736-4c3a-8d80-d763b7a79e63. 
93  Id. 
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